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The Law of International Responsibility. Edited by James Crawford, Alain Pellet, and Simon
Olleson. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. lxv, 1296. Index. $495.
If one were to affix a label to the first decade of work by the UN International Law
Commission (Commission) in this century, a good one to choose would be the “decade of
codifying international responsibility.” No fewer than five projects relating to that general topic
were brought to a conclusion by the Commission in the space of ten years, constituting a
formidable effort at codification that may well influence the field of public international law for
years to come. Given that the Commission had spent decades considering, as part of a single
project, myriad aspects of state responsibility, in some respects these five projects may be seen
as the product of a “divide and conquer” approach. Rather than a single instrument, the
Commission produced five instruments directed at different slices of the field, with considerable
variations among them in breadth, form, and the understanding of whether they reflect settled
law.
In 2001, the principal project on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful
acts1 was steered adroitly to its conclusion under the steady hand of James Crawford, a member
of the Commission from 1992 to 2001 and the Whewell Professor of International Law at
Cambridge University. Core areas of these articles addressed the attribution of conduct to a state,
circumstances that preclude the wrongfulness of state action, consequences arising from a
wrongful act (including reparation), and obligations/rights existing for the breaching/injured
states (including the use of countermeasures to induce compliance), as well as the implications of
the wrongful conduct for third states. As is customary, the Commission adopted useful
commentary in conjunction with the articles, setting forth the basis for the rules in the practice of
states and in the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals.
Simultaneous with the conclusion of those articles, the Commission adopted a set of draft
articles concerning a state’s responsibility with respect to hazardous activities that are not, as
such, prohibited under international law (such as the operation of an oil rig on the continental
shelf), but that nevertheless may have led to adverse consequences for another state. This set of
rules, also adopted in 2001, focused on the prevention of transboundary harm from such
hazardous activities, obliging states to take measures to prevent or at least reduce the likelihood
of damage.2 Among other duties, the state must conduct a risk assessment of a proposed activity
and, when a risk of significant transboundary damage exists, the state must notify the authorities
of the potentially affected state.
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 26,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add. 1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 2001 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility].
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Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, in Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 370, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 144, 157 (2001).
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Continuing with the theme of rules regarding a state’s responsibility for certain activities
that are not prohibited under international law, in 2006 the Commission completed a set of draft
principles on the allocation of loss in the event that a hazardous activity leads to transboundary
harm.3 Here the interesting development was the abandonment of an initial approach that would
have characterized the state itself as liable for significant harm, even when such harm could not
have been prevented through the state’s exercise of due diligence. Due to resistance by states to
that concept, the 2006 principles instead encourage states within their national laws to impose
liability on operators of hazardous activities when transboundary damage occurs and to allow
nondiscriminatory access to national remedies for those harmed abroad. Notably, the final
project took the form of “principles” rather than “articles,” laced in many places with terms such
as should rather than shall, apparently in recognition that the goal of complete harmonization of
national laws was not achievable and that acceptance by states was more likely if the norms were
largely cast as recommendations rather than as hard law.4
The Commission’s 2006 session also finalized draft articles on “diplomatic protection,”
meaning the procedures to be used by a state when one of its nationals is injured by another state
in contravention of international law.5 These draft articles confirmed that the right of diplomatic
protection vests in the state of the injured person’s nationality, including in the state of
predominant nationality if the person is a dual national and the injury is attributable to the state
of the second nationality. Various important elements when advancing a claim are addressed in
these draft articles, including the rule requiring continuous nationality, the rule on exhaustion of
local remedies, and the effects of the state’s waiver of the claim.6
Finally, in 2011, the Commission adopted a set of draft articles on the responsibility of

3

Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of
Hazardous Activities: General Commentary, in Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 106, UN Doc.
A/61/10 (2006).
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See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Sixth Session, UN
GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 160, UN Doc. A/59/10 (2004).
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Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, in Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 16, UN Doc. A/61/10
(2006).
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A further Commission project completed in 2006 concerned not the responsibility of states for
breach of an international obligation but, rather, the way in which that obligation may be formed
through a unilateral declaration of a state. See Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral
Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
367, UN Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
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international organizations. Article 57 of the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility had
excluded from the scope of those articles issues on the responsibility of states for acts of an
international organization. Such “secondary” responsibility of states, as well as the responsibility
of the organizations themselves, formed the subject of the Commission’s 2011 draft articles. In
many respects, these draft articles replicated mutatis mutandis the 2001 draft articles, following a
similar structure and content. The lack of comparable practice and jurisprudence relating to
international organizations in support of many of the Commission’s propositions, however,
resulted in a statement by the Commission at the outset of its commentary that the “fact that
several of the present draft articles are based on limited practice moves the border between
codification and progressive development in the direction of the latter.”8
7

To date, none of the draft articles or principles has been transformed into a treaty; in that
sense, they remain “drafts” that states might use to develop a treaty regime, though at present the
prospects for states doing so are low. The Commission’s approach in sending these projects to
the UN General Assembly has not been to urge the adoption of new conventions; rather, it has
typically recommended that the General Assembly take note of the instrument, with the
possibility at some future point of transforming “draft articles” into “conventions.”
Consequently, the General Assembly has noted the instrument and, in some circumstances,
commended it to the attention of governments without prejudice to the question of its future
adoption as a treaty.9 Hence, the instruments are available for scrutiny, use, and rejection by
states, international organizations, courts, tribunals, and others, with some instruments likely
garnering more support as codification of lex lata, due to their content, form, and character, and
others seen more in the nature of lex ferenda.
As a means of making the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility readily available to
and understood by the general public, in 2002 Crawford published a volume containing the
articles, the associated commentary, a very useful introduction, index, table of cases, and select
bibliography, and a guide to the “legislative history” of the articles, meaning a guide to the
various reports of the Commission dating back to 1950s from which the articles emerged.10 He
also published parallel versions of the volume in French in 200311 and Spanish in 2004.12
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Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 66th Sess.,
Supp. 10, at 54, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011).
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Id. at 70.
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See, e.g., GA Res. 56/83, para. 3 (Dec. 12, 2001); GA Res. 59/35, para. 1 (Dec. 2, 2004) (taking
note of and commending to the attention of governments the 2001 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility); see also James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Continuing Debate on a UN
Convention on State Responsibility, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 959 (2005).
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JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002).
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JAMES CRAWFORD, LES ARTICLES DE LA C.D.I. SUR LA RESPONSABILITÉ DE L’ÉTAT:
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The book under review here, edited by Crawford, Alain Pellet, and Simon Olleson,13 is
yet a further effort to help illuminate the law in this area, this time through expert commentary
by academics and practitioners. Though the commentary exceeds 1,200 pages, the essays are not
lengthy pieces probing a limited range of issues in great depth; rather, the book consists of
almost one hundred essays averaging about 12 pages each, exploring a very wide range of issues
with insightful and pointed analyses. The principal focus is on the rules contained the 2001 draft
articles on state responsibility, but the scope of this volume is broader, covering the other
projects noted above to a greater or lesser degree.13 Moreover, the book pays some attention to
the international responsibility of entities other than states and international organizations, such
as private individuals, armed bands, criminal groups, and nongovernmental organizations. As
such, the volume lives up to its title, attempting to map the different slices of international
responsibility noted above onto one another, in a single conceptual framework.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I addresses the concept and system of
international responsibility in international law, featuring essays by Pellet, Crawford, and Eric
David. Part II considers the mechanics of developing the law in this area, including efforts at
codification and the means by which the international law of responsibility operates in both the
international and national legal systems. Part III turns to the sources of the law of international
responsibility, essentially focusing on the issues of attribution, breach, and circumstances
precluding wrongfulness that were addressed in the first part of the 2001 draft articles on state
responsibility, as well as exploring sources in the absence of an internationally wrongful act.
Part IV reviews the content of law of international responsibility: obligations that arise
when a breach occurs, modalities of reparation, and consequences flowing from violation of an
erga omnes obligation (issues that characterized the second part of the 2001 draft articles on state
responsibility). In an effort to connect such secondary rules to different sets of “primary rules,”
part IV also probes the operation of the rules on responsibility in specific regimes, including
human rights, trade, environment, and investment. The content of the law of international
responsibility is also explored in the context of the absence of an internationally wrongful act,
INTRODUCTION, TEXTE ET COMMENTAIRES (2003).
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JAMES CRAWFORD, LOS ARTÍCULOS DE LA COMISIÓN DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL SOBRE LA
RESPONSABILIDAD INTERNACIONAL DEL ESTADO: INTRODUCCIÓN, TEXTO Y COMENTARIOS (2004).
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A professor at Université de Paris Ouest-Nanterre La Défense, Pellet was a member of the
Commission throughout the period described above, only leaving its service in 2011. Olleson
served as an assistant to Crawford in the summer of 2001 during the Commission’s final
consideration and adoption of the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility, and at present is a
barrister with Thirteen Old Square in London.
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Because the volume was published in 2010 prior to the final adoption of the articles on the
responsibility of international organizations, it focuses on the Commission’s draft articles
adopted on first reading in 2009, not the final version produced in 2011.
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with essays on the “polluter pays” principle, maritime law, space law, and nuclear energy.
Part V addresses the implementation of the law of international responsibility, an area
correlating to the third part of the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility, with a focus on the
rights of the injured party (be it a state, an international organization, or some other entity), the
process for bringing claims, and the availability of countermeasures to induce compliance. Four
appendices provide some of the texts of the International Law Commission, but the real value
comes from an excellent table of cases and statutes, as well as a useful listing of all the reports by
the Commission on these matters.
One cannot help but applaud the prodigious effort to integrate the law in this area and
embellish upon it through copious commentary. Anyone interested in understanding, for
example, the circumstances precluding wrongfulness of a state should begin an inquiry with the
2001 draft articles on state responsibility, supplemented by the Commission’s associated
commentary. But the next stop should be this volume, to see the short but useful commentary on
consent (by Affef Ben Mansour), compliance with peremptory norms (Maja Ménard),
self-defense (Jean-Marc Thouvenin), countermeasures (Hubert Lesaffre), force majeure and
distress (Sandra Szurek), and necessity (Sarah Heathcote). Similarly, the forms of reparation are
recounted in the 2001 articles on state responsibility and explained in the associated
commentary, but this volume contains excellent further analyses on restitution (Christine Gray),
compensation (John Barker), interest (Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Penelope Nevill), and
satisfaction (Eric Wyler and Alain Papaux). Such analyses probe somewhat deeper into the
origins of the relevant rule but also assess the application of the rule by courts and tribunals in
the years following completion of the Commission’s work.
Despite its many strengths, the book has some shortcomings. Starting with the design of
the project, about two-thirds of this book was originally written in French (p. vi), so in many
places the language construction and terminology in English are unusual. A minor example is the
use of the term double nationality (pp. 89, 844), rather than the more common dual nationality,
though the former is the literal translation of the common French term double nationalité. More
seriously, some precision in legal analysis may have been lost in translation, such as the assertion
that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’s inter-state jurisdiction covers “commercial” claims (p. 843),
when it should more narrowly be stated as covering “contractual arrangements” for the sale of
goods and services (hence excluding claims concerning expropriation or any other
non-contractual measure).14 On balance, though, any defects of this kind are more than
compensated by providing access for anglophone readers to francophone views.15
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Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, Art. II(2), reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 3 (1983).
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Those able to do so may wish to refer to the French version of the book published by Pedone
in 2010.
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While the contributors to this volume vary from eminent scholars to budding doctoral
students, the range geographically is much more limited, with fewer than ten of the almost one
hundred contributors based outside of Europe, and those few principally in Australia and Japan,
or at the United Nations.16 Nothing is inherently wrong with a volume of this magnitude being
Eurocentric, but it likely would have been strengthened by including a broader range of views
from scholars and practitioners across the globe, particularly those able to address concepts of
responsibility as they are emerging in regional and subregional contexts.
Turning more directly to substance, an important element not squarely addressed here is
the reaction of governments to the various instruments issued by the Commission, in their
written comments to the Commission, in their statements before the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly in New York, and in other fora. The degree to which these rules are viewed as
authoritatively capturing contemporary international law turns, in part, on their acceptance by
states, such that what governments say about specific articles or principles in the course of their
adoption and thereafter is quite important. For example, the debates in the Sixth Committee on
the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility revealed significant disagreement about the regime
of responsibility associated with jus cogens violations (Articles 40–41), about the invocation of
responsibility by noninjured states (Article 48), and about the treatment of countermeasures
(Articles 49–54). A table in this volume capturing those reactions would have been of great
value, in addition to an essay analyzing the weight to be given such reactions when considering
whether the Commission’s formulations reflect established law.
Within weeks after the completion of the 2001 draft articles on state responsibility, Al
Qaeda orchestrated an attack upon the United States by means of hijacked aircraft that resulted in
the death of more than 3,000 people, mostly civilians. A question that immediately arose
concerned whether Afghanistan, under the de facto control of a largely unrecognized government
(the Taliban), could be viewed as internationally responsible for the attacks, having hosted Al
Qaeda camps for many years, notwithstanding international demands that the camps be closed
and that senior leaders, including Osama bin Laden, be handed over for trial. The 2001 articles
provided no real guidance on these points, for none of the articles on attribution of conduct to
states directly addressed the situation. Could the attack be attributed to the state of Afghanistan?
When attributing conduct, does it matter if the de facto government is not recognized? Did the
United States have to establish first that the Taliban was either unwilling or unable to move
against Al Qaeda before an internationally wrongful act by Afghanistan could be said to exist,
justifying a U.S.-led invasion? Or was the U.S. action in self-defense only against Al Qaeda and
an unrecognized entity, such that issues of state responsibility did not arise? If the United States
identified Al Qaeda operatives in other countries, under what circumstances might the United
States deem those countries responsible for hosting such operatives?
While the 2001 articles did not answer such questions, the volume under review here
might have sought to do so, particularly as it includes essays on attribution of conduct by private
individuals to the state and on the direct responsibility of private individuals, armed bands, and
criminal groups. Yet those essays eschew any detailed discussion of the implications of the 9/11
16

None of the contributors appears to be native to the Americas.
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attacks or any other comparable terrorist attack, leaving things just as muddled as they were in
2001–02.
The quality of the essays is not uniform, a situation perhaps unavoidable in a project of
this scale and breadth. Returning again to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the following assertion
is wrong or at least very misleading: “Despite the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over the
interpretation and execution of the Algiers Declarations, which covers inter-State responsibility,
only one award has expressly established the responsibility of the United States of America for
violation of its obligations towards Iran,” citing to Case A/27 (p. 844). 17 There are, in fact,
several decisions under this “interpretive” jurisdiction (the “A claims”) where the Tribunal has
established the responsibility of the United States to Iran, notably in Case A/15, pt. I:C,18 Case
A/15, pts. II:A and II:B,19 and Case A/15, pt. I:G,20 the latter of which resulted in the payment to
Iran of some $500 million.21 Overall, about twenty of the “A claims” have resulted in an award
or decision by the Tribunal.22 Moreover, as noted above, the Tribunal also has jurisdiction to
decide contract disputes between the two states (the “B claims”), which is also relevant to the
issue of inter-state responsibility, including issues of attribution, circumstances precluding
wrongfulness, forms of reparation, and countermeasures. Seventy-seven “B claims” were filed
by the two states (two-thirds by Iran), and seventy-two of those claims have led to an award or
decision.23 Both Iran24 and the United States25 have been found in violation of their obligations,
17

In Case A/27, the Tribunal found that the United States violated the Algiers Accords by failing
to enforce in U.S. courts a Tribunal award in favor of Iran against a U.S. national. The Tribunal
ordered the United States to pay approximately five million dollars in compensation.
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Iran v. United States (Case A/15, pt. I:C), 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 247 (1990 II).
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Iran v. United States (Case A/15, pts. II:A, II:B), 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (1992).
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Iran v. United States (Case A/15, pt. I:G), 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 40 (1986 III).
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See GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL 497 (1996).
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Jeremy K. Sharpe, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in THE RULES, PRACTICE, AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 545, 554 (Chiara Giorgetti ed.,
2012).
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Id. at 553–54.
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For example, in 1996 the Tribunal issued an award in Case B/36 concerning a U.S. claim for
amounts due from Iran under a World War II military surplus property sales agreement. The
Tribunal found Iran liable for breach of the agreement and ordered Iran to pay the United States
more than $21 million in principal and interest. United States v. Iran, 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
162 (1996); United States v. Iran, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 56, 346 (1997).
25

For example, in 1984 the Tribunal issued an award in Case B/7 concerning an Iranian claim
for reimbursement of advance payments that had been made by the Atomic Energy Organization
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leading to the payment of compensation. Indeed, the principal remaining claims at the Tribunal,
especially Case B/1 (concerning the U.S. foreign military sales program with Iran prior to the
latter’s 1979 revolution), fall under this category of claims and will likely keep the Tribunal
occupied for years to come.
Despite these points, The Law of International Responsibility is an exceptional resource.
Designed to embrace numerous recent initiatives by the Commission in the field of international
responsibility, the volume as a whole provides a variety of useful and important essays, which
are carefully organized and thoughtfully executed by a very talented group of individuals.
SEAN D. MURPHY
George Washington University

of Iran to the U.S. government pursuant to two uranium enrichment services contracts. The
Tribunal found the United States liable and ordered it to pay nearly $8 million to Iran, plus
interest. Iran v. United States, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 141 (1984 II); Iran v. United States, 12
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 25 (1986 III). In Case B/1 (Claim 4), the Tribunal found the United
States liable to pay compensation for certain Iranian military properties that the United States
refused to transfer to Iran after the Iranian revolution, Iran v. United States, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 273 (1988 II), leading to a settlement in which the United States paid Iran $278
million. Iran v. United States, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 282 (1991 II).

